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ARTICLES
All Judicial Politics Are Local:
The Political Trajectory of Judicial
Reform in Haiti
Louis-Alexandre Berg*
I. INTRODUCTION
In January 2012, the Haitian justice system produced two sig-
nificant but seemingly contradictory decisions.  The first came on
January 19 at the end of a highly publicized trial of police officers
and prison guards.  Eight officers were convicted of using unrea-
sonable force in firing on inmates during a prison riot in the city of
Les Cayes, soon after the massive earthquake that shook Haiti in
January 2010.  The court’s decision was hailed as a “landmark
moment for Haitian justice,” and seen as an encouraging sign that
the Haitian judiciary was asserting a newfound credibility in hold-
ing senior law enforcement officials accountable for human rights
abuses.1  Less than two weeks later, on January 27, an investiga-
tive judge dropped all charges against Jean-Claude Duvalier, the
former president of Haiti accused of crimes against humanity,
financial crimes, and embezzlement of public funds during his fif-
teen year reign from 1971 to 1986.  For many human rights activ-
ists, as shocking as the decision itself was the judge’s total
disregard for Haiti’s commitments under international law in
ignoring well-established precedents that no statute of limitation
* Dr. Louis-Alexandre Berg has worked extensively on justice sector reform,
police assistance, and conflict mitigation programs as an Adviser to the World Bank,
the U.S. Agency for International for International Development, and the U.S.
Institute of Peace.  His research explores the effects of foreign aid on governance,
justice, and security in countries affected by violence and conflict, and he has
conducted research in Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo,
and Timor Leste.  Dr. Berg holds a PhD in Government from Georgetown University,
a Masters in Public and International Affairs from Princeton University, and a B.A.
in International Relations from Brown University. He can be contacted at
lb262@georgetown.edu.
1. Deborah Santag & Walt Bogdanich, 8 Guilty for Prison Massacre in Rare Trial
of Haiti’s Police, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/
world/americas/7-haitian-policemen-convicted-in-2011-les-cayes-prison-killings.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0 (quoting William O’Neill, an American human rights lawyer
with decades of experience in Haiti).
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can be applied to gross human rights violations.2  The decision was
widely perceived as evidence of continued interference in judicial
decisions by an executive branch friendly to the former dictator
and his supporters.3
Far from being contradictory, however, both of these decisions
are consistent with the political reality that has shaped the evolu-
tion of the Haitian justice system over the last two decades.  Much
of the attention of donor agencies, international organizations and
observers has focused on the most egregious symptoms of a weak
and dysfunctional system: thousands of citizens have languished
in prison without trial, individuals accused of corruption, human
rights abuse or violence are rarely brought to justice, and the sys-
tem remains inaccessible for most citizens.  A series of reform
efforts over the last two decades have focused on the legal and
organizational deficits that drive these dysfunctions, including
archaic laws and procedures and dominance by the executive
branch that have left the judiciary chronically under-resourced,
poorly skilled and prone to manipulation.  Two decades of reform
efforts backed by international development agencies in North
American and Europe have failed to produce any meaningful
change in either the symptoms of dysfunction or the legal organi-
zational deficits that are believed to cause them.  Instead, the
same political logic that has driven these notorious judicial deci-
sions has also shaped the justice system’s organizational and legal
structure and blocked most attempts to reform it.  Understanding
the performance of the judiciary and the failure of two decades of
reform efforts thus requires looking beyond laws and procedures
to the underlying political reality.
In this article, I argue that the evolution of the Haitian justice
system over the last two decades is rooted in the failure of Haiti’s
transition from authoritarian rule to result in meaningful political
competition or in space for genuine political or civic participation.
Following the demise of a predatory, single-party regime, the judi-
ciary has evolved in the context of persistent efforts by polarized
elites to concentrate political authority while relying on informal
2. For a detailed analysis of this decision, see Une Ordonnance de la Honte a e´te´
rendue par le Juge d’Instruction, 2012 Reseau National de Defense des Droits
Humains [RNDDH] (Feb. 3, 2012); Haiti: Duvalier Ruling Disappoints Justice,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 31, 2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/
31/haiti-duvalier-ruling-disappoints-justice.
3. Haiti: Dropping Jean-Claude Duvalier case ‘a disgrace,’ 2012 AMNESTY INT’L,
(Jan. 31, 2012), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/haiti-dropping-jean-
claude-duvalier-case-disgrace-2012-01-31.
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networks to repress opposition and limit space for civil society.
The role of the judiciary in these political dynamics has played out
most evidently in high-profile judicial decisions, which, like the
Duvalier and Les Cayes decisions, have reflected prevailing politi-
cal tendencies and enabled ruling parties to pursue their political
and economic interests. The political role of the judiciary is fur-
ther evident on a deeper level in local politics, where a compliant
judicial and law enforcement bodies facilitate the distribution of
jobs, economic assets, land and electoral victory, which in turn
enable politicians to maintain power at the national level.  This
political logic has driven decisions regarding the laws and organi-
zational structures that affect the day-to-day performance of the
judiciary.  Yet most efforts by international development agencies
to reform the judiciary have stayed far from these underlying
challenges.  In some cases, foreign aid may even have reinforced
the conditions that have sustained the current structure and per-
formance of the Haitian justice system.
This article analyzes judicial reform efforts in Haiti in light of
the country’s political trajectory.  The analysis that follows is
neither a comprehensive description nor an exhaustive analysis of
Haiti’s justice sector, but is rather an attempt to highlight key ele-
ments of the political context that are typically neglected in analy-
ses of the  justice system.  I draw primarily on published reports,
laws and procedures, as well as on my own research and observa-
tions collected while working on donor-funded justice sector pro-
grams in Haiti.4  The article proceeds as follows.  I first lay out the
primary challenges faced by the justice system. Next, I focus on
the legal and organizational deficits that have been the focus of
most donors and practitioners, and describe their reform efforts.  I
focus on the judicial system, including the courts and prosecutors,
along with the laws, procedures and personnel that make them
up. Although I do not delve into the workings of other parts of the
justice sector, such as the police, corrections system, local govern-
ments and legislature, I highlight areas where the judiciary is
deeply interdependent with them and where they have been
shaped by similar dynamics.5  In the following section, I explain
the failure of reform efforts by highlighting salient features of
4. From 2004 to 2010, the author served as a rule of law advisor for the U.S.
Agency for International Development, where he designed and managed justice sector
development programs in Haiti.
5. For a more thorough analysis of the police and corrections systems, see
Isabelle Fortin & Yves-Franc¸ois Pierre, Haı¨ti et la reforme de la Police Nationale
d’Haiti, 2008 INSTITUT NORD-SUD.
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Haiti’s political transition and its effects on judicial reform efforts.
I argue that the drive for concentration of authority and weakness
of organized constituencies has closed off space for peaceful politi-
cal competition and created incentives to keep the justice system
weak and compliant.  I then show why efforts by external donors
to strengthen the justice sector have failed to bring about mean-
ingful change within this context. This analysis thus points to the
deeply rooted challenges that have limited the impact of efforts to
strengthen the justice system and improve its credibility or
responsiveness to citizens. Yet it also points to avenues for change
that have so far been neglected, many of which lie outside the
legal and judicial processes that have dominated the attention of
donors so far.  In the concluding section, I point to some of these
alternative approaches that might lead to a way out of the cycle of
past failures.
II. THE CHALLENGES FACING THE HAITIAN JUSTICE SYSTEM
The challenges facing the Haitian justice system have been
well documented and frequently described.  At once inaccessible to
most of the population and a source of frequent human rights
abuses, the government of Haiti has itself acknowledged its fail-
ings in describing the “deep mistrust of the judicial system by all
citizens, within a context where access to law and justice remains
difficult and random.”6  Such mistrust appears on the surface to be
fueled by the failures of the justice system to meet basic functions
expected of it, from prosecuting crime to preventing basic human
rights abuses and resolving everyday disputes.  Going one level
deeper, these failings are rooted in the complex legal and institu-
tional structures that have stubbornly resisted efforts at reform
over the last twenty years. Yet both the symptoms of dysfunction
and the failure of legal and institutional reform efforts emerge
from the underlying political reality that has shaped Haiti’s judi-
cial evolution over the last two decades.
A. Symptoms of Judicial Dysfunction
Primary among the concerns of legal and human rights spe-
cialists working in Haiti has been the failure of the justice system
to protect basic human rights. Among the most commonly cited
abuses is the high rate of illegal pretrial detention in Haiti’s over-
6. REPUBLIC OF HAITI, SUMMARY REP. ON INTERIM COOPERATION FRAMEWORK
2004-2006 (July 2004).
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crowded prisons.7  Over the last decade, the percentage of detain-
ees in Haiti’s prisons awaiting final disposition of their cases has
ranged from a low of seventy percent to a high above ninety per-
cent, giving it one of the highest rates of pre-trial detention in the
world.8  This data does not include detainees in police holding
cells, who routinely spend a month or more in these cells prior to
being formally charged yet are not tracked in any official registry.9
Many detainees in Haiti’s prisons and holding cells are held for
longer than the law allows without trial, some have never seen a
judge, and some are held in pre-trial detention longer than the
maximum sentence for the crime for which they are accused.10
At the same time, the justice system is frequently criticized
for its failure to prosecute criminal cases effectively, resulting in
widespread impunity for perpetrators of high-level corruption and
ordinary crime alike.11  In addition to the Duvalier case, the Hai-
tian justice system has failed to investigate, prosecute or convict
scores of human rights abuses and ordinary crimes.12  The massive
earthquake in January 2010, in which hundreds of thousands of
Haitians lost their lives, homes, and livelihoods, highlighted the
system’s failure to investigate or prosecute numerous sexual and
gender-based violence cases that came to light as a result of
women’s increased vulnerability while living in tent camps.13
7. See generally Anne Fuller et al., Prolonged Pretrial Detention in Haiti, VERA
INST. OF JUSTICE (July 2002); National Center for State Courts (NCSC) (2006)
(hereinafter, NCSC (2006)). “Pretrial Detention in Haiti.” Washington, DC: U.S.
Agency for International Development. See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD
REPORT 2011 248-51 (2011).
8. These statistics are based on data from Haiti’s National Prison Administration
(APENA) database.  For statistics and analysis, see Fuller et al., supra note 7; NCSC
(2006), supra note 7.  For global rates, see INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, http://www.
prisonstudies.org (last visited Apr. 4, 2013).
9. NCSC (2006), supra note 7, at 32. See also Fuller et al., supra note 7, at 19.
10. The percentage of detainees in these categories varies considerable over time.
According to an analysis conducted in 2006, only a small percentage were held longer
than their maximum sentences, while the majority were held for short periods of time
and then released – although many beyond the time limits allowed by law without
conviction. See NCSC (2006), supra note 7.
11. See generally Haiti – Justice: Une Barque a la Derive, RNDDH, Jan. 2006.
12. For a description of some of these cases, see SARAH A. DECOSSE & KENNETH
ROTH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Thirst for Justice: A Decade of Impunity in Haiti,
(Sept. 1996), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/HAITI969.
pdf.; See also Haiti: Hundreds Killed Amid Rampant Impunity, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Apr. 13, 2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/print/news/2005/04/13/haiti-
hundreds-killed-amid-rampant-impunity.
13. Press release, Inter-Am. Comm’n H. R., IACHR Expresses Concern over
Situation in Camps for Displaced Persons in Haiti (Nov. 18, 2010); see also
Struggling to Survive: Sexual Exploitation of Displaced Women and Girls in Port-au-
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Overall, the rate of conviction of Haiti’s criminal justice system is
estimated at three percent (compared to between sixty and eighty
percent in the U.S. depending on the type of crime),14 and over
1,200 murders per year are never investigated.15  Despite the over-
crowding in Haiti’s prisons, the country has one of the lowest
incarceration rates in the world, at fifty-five detainees per 100,000
inhabitants.16  In sum, since the justice system is unable to convict
most cases, abuse of rights is common as law enforcement officials
hold people without conviction. Meanwhile, most Haitians are left
with little recourse when they experience a crime, dispute or viola-
tion of their rights.
Haitian citizens’ most common experience with their justice
system, however, is its absence.  For the millions of residents of
Haiti’s poor urban neighborhoods and remote rural villages, the
justice system is not accessible for resolving most issues, whether
civil or criminal.  This reality was starkly exposed following the
2010 earthquake when thousands of families seeking to secure
their properties, belongings, and social benefits in order to rebuild
their homes and livelihoods were blocked by their inability to
secure crucial civil documentation such as birth and death certifi-
cates. According to the World Bank, forty percent of Haitians lack
the basic civil identity documentation necessary to even secure
legal standing before a court.17 The proceedings needed to secure
these documents are highly complex involving numerous steps
and the assistance of a lawyer, and individuals must travel far—
often as far as Port-au-Prince. For other types of civil matters, the
courts are even less accessible. In 2003, Haiti had only 600 judges
and prosecutors and 750 attorneys for a population of over 8 mil-
lion people, including 375 justices of the peace who handle roughly
seventy percent of matters dealt with by the justice system.18  The
number of judges has barely increased since then.  Most courts are
Prince, Haiti, MADRE (2012), available at http://www.madre.org/images/uploads/misc/
1328542465_Haiti%20SE%20Report%20FINAL%20pub%20sm%20ENG%20020212.
pdf.
14. NCSC (2006), supra note 7, at 17.
15. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE CONSORTIUM, ILAC REPORT, 22, (2005).
16. As a comparison, the rates are 213 per 100,000 in the Dominican Republic, 163
per 100,000 in Jamaica, 391 per 100,000 in El Salvador, and 200 per 100,000 in
Mexico. INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, World Prison Brief, http://www.prisonstudies.
org/info/worldbrief/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2013).
17. THE WORLD BANK, SOCIAL RESILIENCE AND STATE FRAGILITY IN HAITI: A
COUNTRY SOCIAL ANALYSIS, 54 (2006).
18. REPUBLIC OF HAITI, supra note 6, at 14. These personnel are spread across 181
Justice of the Peace courts, 15 courts of first instance, and 5 courts of appeal. See Le´on
Saint-Louis, IFES: STATE OF THE JUDICIARY REPORT: HAITI 2002-2003, 38 (2004).
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located in the urban centers and are barely accessible for rural
residents who must contend with poor roads and costly transpor-
tation.  Proceedings are routinely conducted in French while most
Haitians understand only Kreyol and forty percent are illiterate.19
Where courts are geographically accessible, the costs of filing fees
and legal representation are prohibitive for most Haitians, forty-
nine percent of whom live on less than $1USD per day.20  The lim-
ited legal aid provided by bar associations or externally-funded
programs is mostly reserved for criminal defense, with little sup-
port available to victims of crimes or to civil litigants.21
In sum, the justice system is inaccessible and irrelevant for
most Haitians. On the criminal side, because the system is unable
to convict most cases, police routinely detain people without con-
viction. When faced with pressure the police might release these
detained individuals, or they simply leave the prisoners to lan-
guish behind bars. Meanwhile, most Haitians are left with little
recourse when they are victims of a crime, dispute, or violation of
their rights. As a result, less than half of Haiti’s citizens believe
that their courts guarantee a fair trial, and confidence in the Hai-
tian justice system is the lowest in the Americas at 35 percent.22
Few cases are ever brought to court, while the majority of civil
disputes and criminal cases are resolved outside the justice sys-
tem by local “notables” (the term commonly used to describe local
authority figures including local government officials, religious
leaders or community leaders).  The extent to which these infor-
mal processes are fair and credible for various segments of Haiti’s
population is largely unknown within the legal community.
B. The Failure of Legal and Institutional Reform
Efforts
Over the last two decades, extensive efforts have been under-
taken to address these challenges by building more credible and
effective legal and judicial institutions.  Numerous reports by
19. THE WORLD BANK, SOCIAL RESILIENCE AND STATE FRAGILITY IN HAITI: A
COUNTRY SOCIAL ANALYSIS, ii (2006).
20. Id.
21. There are some notable exceptions, including several women’s organizations
that provide assistance to victims of sexual violence. The Institute for Justice and
Democracy in Haiti provides legal assistance on some civil matters such as land and
property issues.
22. DOMINIQUE ZEPHYR & ABBY CORDOVA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., HAITI IN
DISTRESS: THE IMPACT OF 2010 EARTHQUAKE ON CITIZEN LIVES AND PERCEPTIONS 102
(March 2011).
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development agencies, human rights organizations and other
observers have documented the dysfunctions of the justice system
and sought to explain them.  These reports have generally attrib-
uted these dysfunctions to deficits in legal norms and organiza-
tional structures relative to systems in Europe or North America.
For example, a 2000 U.S. Government Accounting Office report
highlighted a long list of deficits, including: “lack [of] indepen-
dence from the executive branch . . . outdated legal codes and cum-
bersome judicial proceedings . . . inadequate infrastructure and
shortages of personnel and equipment . . . limited investigative
capabilities . . . corruption and an ineffective internal oversight
capability.”23  In response, development agencies and Haitian legal
professionals have pursued various approaches to overcoming
these deficits, ranging from training officials to improve their
skills, to re-drafting laws and procedures, setting up new adminis-
trative and management systems, and funding legal aid programs
to help cases move through the system.
Two sets of issues have tended to receive the bulk of attention
by external donors: the functioning of the criminal justice system
and the limitations of its legal and procedural codes; and the orga-
nizational structure of the judiciary, including internal adminis-
tration and the relationship between the judicial and executive
branches.  Confronting the legal and organizational shortfalls in
these two areas have been seen as fundamental to overcoming the
weak performance of the justice system.  At the same time, these
two areas serve to illustrate the failure of reform efforts.  Despite
a wide range of programs and approaches, the laws and organiza-
tional structures remain mostly unchanged. Most efforts to revise
legal norms, restructure organizations and enhance the skills of
personnel have failed to take root, while case delay, human rights
abuse and barriers to access persist.
In the criminal justice realm, antiquated laws, procedures
and practices have been the target of considerable reform efforts.
Haiti’s five major codes, the penal code, civil code, commercial
code, criminal procedure code and civil procedure code, which are
mostly reproductions of the French Napoleonic codes, have
remained largely unchanged since they were adopted in 1835.
While similar codes in Europe and Latin America have undergone
substantial revisions to reflect modern criminal challenges and
23. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE: ANY
FURTHER AID TO HAITIAN JUSTICE SYSTEM SHOULD BE LINKED TO PERFORMANCE-
RELATED CONDITIONS, 14 (2000).
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legal thinking, Haiti’s codes have remained mostly stagnant.24   In
some areas, the codes violate the country’s 1987 Constitution.25
For example, the penal code stipulates that twenty or more per-
sons who gather to discuss religion, politics or literary issues with-
out official government permission are committing a crime, in
violation of constitutional protection of freedom of speech and
assembly.26  The penal codes also fail to adequately protect women
and children from sexual and gender-based violence, or recognize
such “modern” crimes as corruption and organized crime, cyber-
crime, trafficking in persons, torture and crimes against human-
ity.  Although some of these gaps have been filled through new
legislation in the last few years, their implementation has been
stymied by the complexity of criminal procedure.  The criminal
procedure codes require multiple and cumbersome steps for a case
to advance from the initial report through the investigation,
involving files changing hands several times between the justice of
the peace, prosecutors and investigating judges.27  The procedural
law also lacks many of the basic investigative tools and eviden-
tiary standards that facilitate criminal investigation in other
jurisdictions.
These complex procedures have persistently contributed to
both the high rate of illegal pre-trial detention in Haiti’s prisons
and police stations and the failure to successfully prosecute crimi-
nal cases.  The complexity of the procedures generates numerous
opportunities for manipulation, and case files are frequently lost
or delayed as they change hands among justices of the peace, pros-
ecutors, judges, and clerks.28  Frequent personnel rotations, the
lack of filing procedures or case management system, and poor
management further contribute to case delay. Within this complex
system, political or economic pressures seem to frequently play
the deciding role in whether cases advance, although the cause of
24. On the evolution of procedure elsewhere in Latin America, see generally LINN
A. HAMMERGREN, ENVISIONING REFORM: IMPROVING JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE IN LATIN
AMERICA, (Pa. State Univ. Press, 2007).
25. For a detailed analysis, see generally HANS JOERG ALBRECHT ET AL., USIP
PEACE BRIEFING: BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW IN HAITI: NEW LAWS FOR A NEW ERA,
(2009).
26. CODE PE´NAL [C. PE´N], art. 162–64 ; 236 (Haiti).
27. See generally Code d’Instruction Criminelle (Haiti).
28. For a detailed treatment of procedural elements that contribute to pre-trial
detention and corruption, see Fuller et al., supra  note 7; see also COMMISSION
CONSULTATIVE SUR LA DETENTION PREVENTIVE PROLONGEE (CCDPP), RAPPORT FINAL
SUR LA PROBLE´MATIQUE DE LA DE´TENTION PRE´VENTIVE PROLONGE´E DANS LA JURIDICTION
DU TRIBUNAL DE PREMIE`RE INSTANCE DE PORT-AU-PRINCE (2008).
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delay for any individual case is generally opaque.  Provisions man-
dating severe jail sentences for minor crimes along with the
absence of provisions for bail and alternative forms of sentencing
further contribute to overcrowding in Haiti’s prisons.29
Haiti’s outdated legal codes have also impeded efforts to
improve investigation and prosecution outcomes.  Unrealistic time
limits—two months for the investigation of even the most serious
felonies—along with the absence of provisions for the use of physi-
cal evidence or for the protection for victims or witnesses impede
the effective prosecution of all but the most minor crimes. The
absence of procedures governing the use of basic forms of evidence
beyond oral testimony leaves the results subject to a high level of
discretion.  In some cases, motivated prosecutors and judges rely
on oral confessions and broad discretion to enable conviction, but
often at the expense of the rights of the accused.30  Moreover, these
decisions are easily challenged on appeal, especially when subject
to political pressure.
In the face of these complex procedures, efforts by donors to
reduce pre-trial detention or improve prosecution outcomes
through training and capacity-building have failed to achieve
their intended outcomes.  Donor-funded efforts have attempted to
tackle these problems by training personnel or intervening
directly to reduce the number of detainees held in prisons and
police stations beyond the period allowed by law.31 Special task
forces, case management systems, special sessions and other
administrative measures have at times temporarily reduced the
number of detainees held illegally, but as these special measures
end, personnel have reverted to the procedures specified in law
and the percentage of pre-trial detainees inevitably increases.32
29. For example, Article 408 and Article 409 of the Penal Code provide for up to
six months in prison for theft of an object whose value does not exceed US $20. CODE
PE´NAL [C. PE´N.] art. 408-409 (Haiti).
30. One prosecutor explained to the author that to prosecute organized crime
cases, since no witnesses were willing to testify and no physical evidence was
provided, he relied primarily on newspaper reports about the crimes of the accused.
He noted that he was often successful in achieving convictions in this way. Interview
with Haitian Prosecutor (name withheld), in Port-au-Prince, Haiti (Oct.  2011).
31. The USAID-funded Bureau de Controle de la Detention Preventive
(BUCODEP) program, established in 1998, was among the first efforts to review
individual cases of pre-trial detainees and set up expedited measures to processes
these cases. Several projects have pursued similar approaches over the last decade
that include intensive review of cases expedited processing, and analysis of broader
obstacles. See National Center for State Courts, Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 26-28
(Aug. 2004), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACM444.pdf.
32. One recent attempt by a prosecutor in Port-au-Prince to reduce case delay
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Successes in reducing high levels of pre-trial detention in other
countries have almost always required revisions to the criminal
procedure, such as time limits with mandatory releases or the
introduction of plea bargaining, rather than administrative
approaches alone. Efforts to train police, prosecutors and judges in
modern investigative techniques and procedures have similarly
produced little sustained impact. Outside trainers have tended to
base their training on procedures from other jurisdictions that are
inconsistent with Haitian law because many types of evidence and
techniques are not regulated by Haitian law. Like the special pro-
cedures put in place to reduce pre-trial detention, these practices
are most often abandoned soon after international trainers
depart.
On a parallel track, Haitian lawyers have attempted to
reform criminal procedures and criminal codes.  A series of legal
reform commissions beginning with the Commission Preparatoire
a la Reform du Droit et de la Justice (Preparatory Justice and Law
Reform Commission) established in 1997 have recommended
numerous legal amendments and produced several draft laws.
Several special commissions focusing on pre-trial detention, crimi-
nal investigation and other issues have concluded that reforms to
the codes are essential, and provided numerous recommendations
and approaches to doing so.33 Yet none of these efforts have
resulted in substantial changes, especially to criminal procedure.
The most recent in this long series of efforts was a Presidential
Commission on Justice Sector Reform established in 2009, which
produced a revised penal code and criminal procedure code. Led by
former Justice Minister Rene Magloire, the commission worked
with “model codes” produced by the Washington-based U.S. Insti-
tute of Peace, which were adapted to the local context through
extensive discussions and consultations.34  The draft proposed
many significant—and sometimes controversial—innovations,
such as the abolition of the role of the investigative judge, the
introduction of plea-bargaining and alternative forms of incarcer-
ation, and provisions for new forms of evidence.35  A parallel effort
through administrative procedures achieved only temporary effect because it was
abandoned when that prosecutor was transferred. See International Donor Assistance
to the Justice System in Haiti: Evaluation Report, 2008 US AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. 24
(2008).
33. See generally CCDPP, supra note 30.
34. ALBRECHT ET AL., supra note 25, at 5.
35. Interview with Rene Magloire, former Justice Minister, in Port-au-Prince,
Haiti (Apr. 2011).
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produced a draft law aimed at establishing a national system of
legal aid to help criminal defendants navigate the justice system.
Despite formal endorsement by current and prior Ministers of
Justice, however, the draft laws did not make it to the Parliament.
Moreover, the passage of these draft laws would constitute only
the first step in a lengthy and intensive process of implementation
that will require training justice sector professionals and applying
new—and sometimes costly—procedural requirements. As of this
writing, efforts to reform the criminal law and procedure remain
unfulfilled.
A second broad area of reform efforts has focused on the weak
administration of justice and dominance of the judiciary by the
executive branch, which have contributed to widespread percep-
tion of corruption.  Despite its formal status as a fully independent
branch of government, the judicial branch has remained fully
dependent on the executive branch for most of the last two
decades.  The 1987 Constitution established the judiciary as a
fully independent branch of government, co-equal to the legisla-
tive and executive branches, and “entirely responsible for its own
acts.”36  The Constitution provides judges with security of tenure,
sets out mechanisms for public participation in their nomination,
and authorizes the judiciary to manage its own administration.37
Judges of the Supreme Court are to be nominated by the Senate,
the departmental assemblies nominate appellate judges, and com-
munal assemblies nominate first instance judges, and justices of
the peace.  In practice, however, the communal and departmental
assemblies have never been established, and the judiciary has not
had its own systems for administration or self-governance.
Responsibility for managing the courts, prosecutors and all of
their human and physical resources has fallen to the Ministry of
Justice and Public Security (MJSP). The MJSP appoints, trans-
fers and removes judges, prosecutors and justices of the peace,
36. Constitution de la Re´publique d’Haiti Mar. 29, 1987, Title V, art. 60-2.
37. In the 1987 Constitution of Haiti, Article 175 provides for appointment of
judges based on lists generated by communal, department and national assemblies,
however the local assemblies have never existed in practice. Id. at Ch. V, art 175; see
also Article 177 stating that “Judges of the Supreme Court, the Courts of Appeal and
the Courts of First Instance are appointed for life. They may be removed from office
only because of a legally determined abuse of authority or be suspended following and
indictment leveled against them. They may not be reassigned, without their consent,
even in the case of a promotion. Their service may be terminated during their term of
office only in the event of a duly determined permanent physical or mental
incapacity.” Id. at Ch. V, art. 177.
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and manages most of the judiciary’s budget, finances and
administration.
The judiciary’s position under the control of the MJSP has
contributed to its weak administrative capacity, vulnerability to
manipulation, and inability to ensure internal discipline or
accountability. The MJSP is itself woefully understaffed and
under-resourced—with only one percent of the national budget—
and it typically allocates only eleven percent of that meager
budget to the courts, with the rest devoted to police, corrections,
the civil registry and other functions.38  Without a dedicated
budget or separate administrative structure to manage the courts,
set policy or allocate resources, judges, prosecutors, and court per-
sonnel have been unable to adopt or sustain even the most basic
administrative systems.39 The tendency of the MJSP to frequently
rotate judges and prosecutors according to bureaucratic—and
often political—imperatives has undermined improvements in
management and administration. As personnel tend to rotate to
other positions as soon as they are trained in new procedures,
efforts to train them in specific areas of the law have rarely
improved overall performance.  Control by the executive branch
over all administrative and financial matters has also enabled
constant influence and pressure.40  In the absence of clear rules or
procedures governing disciplinary matters for judges, the MJSP
has removed several justices of the peace, prosecutors, and judges
without a formal disciplinary process.41  Some of these removals
may have been motivated by legitimate allegations of corruption.
Nonetheless, the absence of procedures for proving or disproving
such allegations has left the process open to manipulation and
fueled the common perception that judges are neither indepen-
dent nor neutral, and that economic and political pressure shape
decisions.
Reform efforts by donors and Haitian civil society actors have
therefore focused on strengthening administrative practices and
on establishing an independent judicial council that would man-
38. National Center for State Courts, supra note 31, at 22.
39. For instance, one review found that case registration procedures introduced by
a USAID-funded program had not been sustained because they had run out of
logbooks. See International Donor Assistance to the Justice System in Haiti:
Evaluation Report, 2008 U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. (2008).
40. See Leon St. Louis, State of the Judiciary Report: Haiti 2002-2003, 2004 INT’L
FOUND. FOR ELECTION SYS. 20.
41. Id. at 24.
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age the affairs of the judiciary.42  Most projects have focused on
developing new administrative and management practices to
improve the efficiency and consistency of judicial processes, and
reduce opportunities for discretion and manipulation. For exam-
ple, several donor-funded programs sought to set up case registra-
tion and tracking systems in courts and prosecutors’ offices to
improve the flow of cases and to reduce delay and corruption.43  In
the absence of an organizational structure that could sustain
reforms, however, few of these efforts have outlasted the programs
that sponsored them.  As courts have run out of logbooks, file fold-
ers and other supplies due to the lack of sufficient resources or
management procedures within the judiciary, they have reverted
to more traditional ways of operating.44
As progress on strengthening administrative and manage-
ment practices has lagged, donors and Haitian activists have also
sought to reform the organizational structure that has contributed
to keeping the judiciary under-resourced, poorly managed and
vulnerable. Reports produced by USAID dating back to the 1990s
pointed out the contradiction between constitutionally mandated
separation of powers and continued dominance of the executive
over the judiciary, and recommended measures for enhancing the
authority of the judiciary over its own affairs.45  Laws to this effect
were proposed as early as 1998 but never taken up by the Haitian
legislature.  Since 2004, donors have devoted greater attention to
42. These efforts reflect interest by donors across Latin America to support
judicial councils as a means to promote judicial independence and accountability. See
generally Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardians: Judicial
Councils and Judicial Independence, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 103 (2009); Linn
Hammergren, Do Judicial Councils Further Judicial Reform? Lessons from Latin
America 1-52 (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, Working Paper No. 28, 2002),
available at http://law.wisc.edu/gls/lhdjc.pdf; Violane Autheman & Sandra Elena,
Global Best Practices-Judicial Councils: Lessons Learned from Europe and Latin
America, 2004 INT’L FOUND. FOR ELECTION SYS., available at http://www.ifes.org/~/
media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/2004/22/WhitePaper_2_FINAL.pdf.
43. See U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE HAITI SPECIAL COORDINATOR,
REPORT TO CONGRESS: ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAITI REBUILDING AND
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (June 6, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/s/hsc/rpt/
191881.htm.
44. See generally U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., HAITI: RULE OF LAW ASSESSMENT
(Aug. 2004), available for download at: https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/GetDoc.axd?ctID=OD
VhZjk4NWQtM2YyMi00YjRmLTkxNjktZTcxMjM2NDBmY2Uy&rID=MzA0NzAw&
pID=NTYw&attchmnt=VHJ1ZQ=&uSesDM=False&rIdx=MTAxOTE1&rCFU=.
45. See e.g., CREATIVE ASSOC. INT’L, EVALUATION OF USAID’S ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS FUND II PROGRAMS 88 (Apr. 1997).  To access the full
library of U.S. AID’s Haiti Evaluation reports, go to U.S. AID’s “Haiti” page, and click
the link under “Learn More” entitled “Evaluations for Haiti” at http://www.usaid.gov/
where-we-work/latin-american-and-caribbean/haiti.
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implementing constitutional provisions establishing the indepen-
dence of the judicial branch.  These efforts eventually resulted in a
significant breakthrough in 2007. A campaign by legislators, civil
society actors, and judges supported by donor resources and atten-
tion resulted in the passage of three new laws to govern the judici-
ary and remove it from the control of the executive branch.  The
Law on the Conseil Superieur du Pouvoir Judiciaire (CSPJ) estab-
lishes a High Judicial Council with authority over selection,
appointment, discipline of judges, as well as over the administra-
tion of justice and management of financial and material
resources.46  The law on the Statut de la Magistrature regulates
the functions and career standards for judges, prosecutors, and
judges of the peace, and raises judicial salaries.47  The third law
formally establishes the Ecole de la Magistrature (EMA), a train-
ing academy for judges and prosecutors. The academy was previ-
ously set up with donor assistance in the early 1990s, but was
severely constrained by its lack of legal status.48  These three laws
were seen as the foundation for building the organizational and
administrative infrastructure that could manage judicial func-
tions and insulate them from executive influence.
Over five years after their adoption, however, the constitu-
tional and legal provisions protecting judicial independence and
self-governance remain unfulfilled.  Although President Rene
Preval signed and promulgated the laws in 2007, his failure to
appoint justices to fill six vacant positions on the Supreme Court,
including that of the Chief Justice whose presence was required to
convene the new High Judicial Council, effectively blocked the
implementation of these three laws. The resulting stalemate
between the executive branch and the judiciary exacted a broader
toll, as the Supreme Court could not achieve a quorum to rule on
many cases, and donors began to withhold their assistance to the
sector. In February 2012, nearly a year into the presidency of
Michel Martelly—who had made the rule of law one of the four
pillars of his administration—the vacant positions on the
Supreme Court were filled and the government announced that it
would establish the CSPJ and implement the three laws.  Yet this
belated step was only the first in the long process required to
46. Loi Creant le Conseil Superieur du Pouvoir Judiciaire [Act Establishing the
Higher Council of the Judiciary], MONITEUR No. 112, Dec. 20, 2007.
47. Loi Portant Statut de la Magistrature, [Statute Regulating the Judiciary],
MONITEUR No. 112, Dec. 20, 2007.
48. Loi Relative a L’Ecole de la Magistrature, [Act Regarding the Judicial
Institution], MONITEUR No. 112, Dec. 20, 2007.
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establish and maintain a functional and credible judicial council.
The appointments themselves were mired in controversy, and the
CSPJ initially lacked formal allocation of staff and budget that
would allow it to function.  Given the challenges in its initial
implementation, it will inevitably encounter further obstacles
along the way.  Meanwhile, the local assemblies that are constitu-
tionally mandated to nominate lower court judges still do not
exist, and alternative procedures for nomination, appointment or
transfer of judges have yet to be adopted. Neither the legal struc-
tures guaranteeing judicial independence nor the administrative
practices envisioned by donors have so far been implemented.
III. THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF HAITI’S
JUDICIAL EVOLUTION
The challenges facing the Haitian justice system and the lim-
ited success of reform efforts reflect broader political and social
forces that have shaped the development of the Haitian state over
the last two decades.  As development agencies have focused on
the organizational structures and laws that comprise the Haitian
justice sector, they have made little headway in overcoming the
key challenges. Instead, they have repeatedly confronted
entrenched obstacles that have arisen even when the opportuni-
ties for reform appear ripe. The focus on the deficits in Haitian
law and procedure relative to an external standard has obscured
the context in which they are embedded.  The Haitian justice sys-
tem may be dysfunctional measured according to external stan-
dards, but it is also the product of a particular set of social and
political conditions that continue to sustain it and undermine
efforts to fit it to external standards.  The evolution of the judici-
ary cannot, therefore, be explained through examination of its
legal and organizational structures alone, but requires a deeper
look at the political and social forces that have shaped it.
Looking outside Haiti, comparative literature on the develop-
ment of judicial institutions has looked beyond legal norms or
organizational structures to their political and social context.  In
his seminal study of judicial development, Martin Shapiro traced
the origin of independent judiciaries in Europe to highly political
processes that included attempts by powerful nobles and
merchants to restrain predatory monarchies.49  A rich literature
49. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 63, 155-56
(2nd ed. 1986).
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has since developed on the political dimensions of judicial evolu-
tion.  Several scholars link the emergence of judicial independence
to the nature of political authority and competition among interest
groups and political parties.50 Where power is shared among mul-
tiple parties and political competition is intense, no group is able
to exert sufficient influence to dominate the courts. In such con-
texts, both the ruling and opposition parties have incentives to
support an independent judiciary that can serve as a “neutral
arbiter” rather than risk being punished by a politicized judiciary
when they are out of power.51  Other authors have emphasized the
role of interest groups and citizens in advocating for independent
and effective judiciaries, when they are sufficiently organized to
influence political decision-making.52  In the context of contempo-
rary transitions from conflict or authoritarian rule in developing
countries, judicial independence has emerged as a result of critical
junctures of factors, including support within the executive for a
break with past practices, a judicial leadership that is willing and
able to make its case for greater independence, and, often, pres-
sure by external donors.53  The process of building a judiciary that
enjoys popular trust may also involve a lengthy period of confi-
dence-building among increasingly capable and assertive judges,
50. J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts, 23 J. LEG. STUD.
721 (1994); see generally TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES:
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES (2003); MARK J. RAMSEYER & ERIC B.
RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING
IN JAPAN (2003); Matthew C. Stephenson, “When the Devil Turns. . .”: The Political
Foundations of Judicial Independent Judicial Review, 32 (1) J. LEG. STUD. 59 (2003);
John A. Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
41 (2002); see generally John A. Ferejohn, Frances McCall Rosenbluth & Charles R.
Shipan, Comparative Judicial Politics, (October 2004), SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
NETWORK (SSRN) http://ssrn.com/abstract=1154123; William Landes & Richard
Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON.
875 (1975).
51. Bjorn Dressel & Marcus Mietzner, A Tale of Two Courts: The Judicialization
of Electoral Politics in Asia, 25 GOVERNANCE, 391-414 (2012).
52. Eric G. Jensen, The Rule of Law and Judicial Reform: The Political Economy
of Diverse Institutional Patterns and Reformer’s Responses, in BEYOND COMMON
KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW, 336 (Erik G. Jensen &
Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003); Jennifer Widner, Courts and Democracy in Postconflict
Transitions: A Social Scientist’s Perspective on the African Case, 95 AM. J. INT.’L L.,
64-75 (2001); see also Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and
the Rule of Law, 91(2) AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245 (1997).
53. Jennifer Widner, Courts and Democracy in Postconflict Transitions: A Social
Scientist’s Perspective on the African Case, 95 AM. J. INT.’L L., 64-75 (2001); WIDNER,
BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW: FRANCIS NYALAI AND THE ROAD TO JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN AFRICA 198-99 (2001); Mariana Prado & Michael Trebilcock, Path
Dependence, Development, and the Dynamics of Institutional Reform, 59 U. TORONTO
L.J. 341, 345 (2009).
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bar and law societies playing watchdog roles over judicial
processes and appointments, and interest groups and opposition
parties with incentives to support them.54  In sum, the develop-
ment of a judiciary during transitions from authoritarian rule or
conflict cannot be understood outside the context of the political
forces that drive those transitions.
The evolution of the Haitian judiciary should thus be
examined within the context of Haiti’s transition from authorita-
rian rule. Following the end of authoritarian rule and the adop-
tion of the 1987 Constitution, Haitian citizens and their
international partners had high hopes for the establishment of
democratic rule underpinned by effective judicial and law enforce-
ment institutions.  Yet this transition—which by many accounts is
not yet complete—has not generated the type of political competi-
tion or organized constituencies that might enable the develop-
ment of independent, credible or effective judiciaries. Instead, a
persistent drive toward concentrated and exclusive political
authority combined with restricted space for organized interest
groups has prevented the emergence of an independent, credible
or capable judiciary.
For most of its history, the Haitian judiciary served to rein-
force a highly centralized and predatory state, while remaining
distant and irrelevant for most of Haiti’s citizens. Since its strug-
gle for independence from France in 1805, the Haitian state has
been the object of an unending succession of violent contests for
control of the state and its resources by elite property owners and
military leaders.55  As one observer noted, “Haitian rulers came to
conceive of governance as a zero-sum game; virtually all of them
looked at political power as a brutal, indivisible quantity that
could be won collectively, but that had to be kept individually and
exercised absolutely.”56  Most state institutions, including the judi-
ciary, served as a spoil of victory within these contests and as a
means to sustain the power of elites by consolidating authority
54. Id.
55. Following the Haitian revolution in 1804-1805, an internal power struggle
resulted in 22 regime changes beginning in 1843 until 1915. In 1915, the U.S. military
intervened and occupied Haiti for 19 years. See MATS LUNDAHL, PEASANTS AND
POVERTY: A STUDY OF HAITI (1979); EUGENE D. GENOVESE, FROM REBELLION TO
REVOLUTION: AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVE REVOLTS IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD
89 (1979).
56. Robert Fatton Jr., Haiti: the Saturnalia of Emancipation and the Vicissitudes
of Predatory Rule, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 118 (2006).
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and excluding opponents. At the same time, these institutions
played little tangible role in the lives of most Haitians.
The use of justice institutions to maintain concentrated
authority deepened during the Duvalier regime, which lasted from
the election of Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier in 1957 until his son
Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier was ousted in 1987.  Following
decades of instability and a series of coups, the Duvaliers achieved
thirty years of relative stability by centralizing state functions in
Port-au-Prince under their direct control. They neutralized the
military and other threats to their authority through the estab-
lishment of a nationwide—and personally loyal—paramilitary
force, the Volunteers for National Security (VSN) popularly
known as the Tonton Macoutes. In rural areas, authority was con-
centrated in the hands of the “chef de section,” an individual who
was directly appointed by the president to perform all local func-
tions from general administration, to judicial and police functions.
The chef de section, along with all other members of rural commu-
nities, was informally supervised by the local VSN.57 In this con-
text, the judiciary served as another apparatus of control, both as
a tool of state repression—often through the use of extortion and
torture—and as a means to maintain informal networks of loyalty
and control through the distribution of jobs to loyal supporters.
Many judges and justices of the peace appointed on this basis
lacked any knowledge of the law, and many were illiterate.58
Meanwhile, most Haitians tended to agree with the sentiment
expressed by one Haitian peasant, who lumped together “’func-
tionaries of the State (leta), doctors, lawyers, priests, pastors, oun-
gans (Vodou priests), notaries, surveyors and the justice of the
peace,” categorizing them all, and without reservation, as vole`, or
“thieves.”59
The fall of the Duvalier regime and the adoption of the 1987
Constitution were supposed to usher in democratic governance,
peaceful political competition and the rule of law. Over the next
two decades, Haitian citizens participated in several local and
national elections, the army was disbanded, and a new civilian
57. Pnina Lahav, The Chef de Section: Structure and Functions of Haiti’s Basic
Administrative Institution, in OCCASIONAL PAPERS NO. 4: WORKING PAPERS IN HAITIAN
SOCIETY AND CULTURE, (Sidney W. Mintz ed., Antilles Research Program at Yale
University 1975).
58. DECOSSE & ROTH, supra note 12, at 6.
59. LOUIS HERNS MARCELIN & PIERRE-MICHEL FONTAINE, SOCIETAL DYNAMICS AND
FRAGILITY IN TODAY’S HAITI 19 (Interuniversity Institute for Research and
Development [INURED] ed., 2011).
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police force was established.  Despite these trappings of democ-
racy, however, the concentration of power persisted and fueled the
continued use of the justice system to maintain exclusive
authority.
Rather than fostering peaceful competition and constructive
opposition, two decades of transition gave rise to zero-sum compe-
tition among political elites representing two highly segmented
and polarized social classes. Haitian elections have been the set-
ting for repeated episodes of political violence.  From 1987 until
2010, Haiti did not experience a peaceful electoral transition from
one party to another, and each set of elections was marked by vio-
lent intimidation, accusations of electoral fraud, and external
pressure.60  After Haiti’s first democratic elections were aborted by
violence in 1987, the first popularly elected presidency of Bertrand
Aristide, which began in 1991, was interrupted by a violent coup
after only seven months.  Following contested elections that
brought Aristide back to power in 2000, another round of violence
resulted in Aristide’s flight from the country and the establish-
ment of a transitional administration backed by international
peacekeepers but dominated by Aristide’s political opponents.
Violent political competition played out in the streets of Port-au-
Prince over the subsequent two years, ending only after the re-
election of Rene Preval to a second term in 2006.  The 2012 elec-
tions resulted in a smoother transition, but were also overshad-
owed by the threat of violence.
During each of these transitions and subsequent administra-
tions, the judiciary served successive ruling elites as they sought
to achieve exclusive control over state institutions and economic
assets in order to perpetuate their control at the national and local
level.  Most directly, in the context of violent political competition
and limited space for peaceful opposition the judiciary has served
to enable and legitimate repression of political opposition.  Follow-
ing the 1991 coup, the coup regime conducted a brutal campaign
to repress political opposition, resulting in 2-3,000 deaths and
over 100,000 refugees.61 Abuses declined substantially following
the end of the coup and Aristide’s return to power in 1991, but
Aristide was accused of using armed groups to intimidate rivals
and using the courts to legitimate abuses, especially during his
second term.  International observers from the Inter-American
60. DANIEL P. ERIKSON, HAITI, FREEDOM HOUSE: COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS
(2010), available at http://freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2010/haiti.
61. DECOSSE & ROTH, supra note 12, at 14.
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Commission on Human Rights found that “certain judges and
magistrates have been pressured by authorities, by gangs or vio-
lent and sometimes armed groups seeking to influence the out-
come of certain cases, particularly when they are dealing with
politically charged matters.”62  The interim government of 2004-
2006, which was dominated by Aristide’s political opponents, was
similarly accused of manipulating the judicial process against
Aristide supporters and in favor of his opponents.63  One of the
more notorious judicial decisions during that period—the reversal
of the landmark conviction of former military and paramilitary
leaders in connection with the 1994 Raboteau Massacre—high-
lighted the judiciary’s tendency to shift with the political tides.64
Both the conviction and its reversal are emblematic of a far
broader set of cases, including the Les Cayes and Duvalier cases
described above, in which decisions appeared to be driven—or at
least not blocked—according to the political expediencies of the
ruling elite.
The judiciary also evolved in the absence of organized or effec-
tive political parties and constituencies as parties and factions
have sought to maintain exclusive power.  Following the end of the
authoritarian Duvalier regime and the opening for democracy,
local associations known as the Organizations Populaires (OPs)
emerged to channel public participation in the newly opened dem-
ocratic process.  Yet these groups never fully coalesced into demo-
cratic political parties or interest groups that could coordinate
interests or translate them into coherent positions.  The military
regime of 1991-94 violently suppressed these organizations as it
sought to “systematically . . . eviscerate all civic, popular and pro-
fessional organizations opposed to [the government’s] authorita-
rian rule.”65  After his return to power, Aristide did not build
formal political party structures and instead reached directly to
the masses through informal links to the local leaders who had
62. Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm’n H. R., Organization of American States,
Press Release No. 24/03 (Aug. 22, 2003), available at http://www.cidh.org/
comunicados/english/2003/24.03.htm.
63. Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm’n H. R., Organization of American States,
Press Release No. 19/04, (Sept. 7, 2004), available at http://www.cidh.org/
comunicados/english/2004/19.04.htm.
64. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, HAITI: OBLITERATING JUSTICE, OVERTURNING OF
SENTENCE FOR RABOTEAU MASSACRE BY SUPREME COURT IS A HUGE STEP BACKWARD
(May 26, 2005).
65. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1994: HAITI (1994), available at http://
www.hrw.org/reports/1994/WR94/Americas-06.htm#P330_164164.
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been active in opposing the military regime.66  His party frag-
mented following the end of his first term, leading to a prolifera-
tion of political parties and informal political networks, and
setting the stage for the disputed elections of 2000.67  The groups
opposed to Aristide, including private sector interests, former mil-
itary leaders, and members of the former ruling elite, similarly
cultivated networks outside formal party or interest group struc-
tures.  During the last two national elections, over sixty political
parties participated,68 most of them dominated by individual lead-
ers with no organized constituency or discernible policy platform.69
In this context, politicians have maintained their authority by
cultivating informal networks of loyal supporters rather than for-
mal alliances with parties and interest groups, and used the com-
pliant judiciary to perpetuate these networks.  A pliable judiciary
has permitted elites to maintain local monopolies over economic
activities, and to edge out rivals by manipulating the police and
courts.  Business leaders exploit informal ties with politicians to
skew judicial processes in order to monopolize business interests.70
Economic monopolies enable elites to maintain their authority by
distributing jobs and access to financial opportunities in exchange
for political support.  The members of these groups, in turn, work
to secure votes for their patrons, sometimes using violence and
intimidation.71
The weakness of the judiciary has also enabled politicians to
transfer land to loyal followers, often through extra-legal means.
Despite competing claims, those affected have little recourse to
66. Fatton, supra note 56, at 123.
67. See, e.g., Daniel Erikson, The Haiti Dilemma, X-2 BROWN J. OF WORLD AFF.
285, 287 (2004).
68. See Haiti’s Provisional Electoral Council, http://www.cephaiti2010.org/index.
php.
69. Erikson, supra note 60, at 6.
70. The 2009 Index of Economic Freedom awarded Haiti one of the lowest possible
scores for property rights, noting that “protection of investors and property is severely
compromised by weak enforcement, a paucity of updated laws to handle modern
commercial practices, and a dysfunctional and resource-poor legal system . . . most
commercial disputes are settled out of court if at all.” THE WALL STREET JOURNAL &
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, THE 2009 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM (2009), available
at http://blog.heritage.org/2009/01/13/the-2009-index-of-economic-freedom/.
71. Philippe Tremblay, Haiti A Bitter Bicentennial: Report of a Mission by Rights
& Democracy 14 (Rights & Democracy 2004), see also ROBERT MUGGAH, SECURING
HAITI’S TRANSITION: REVIEWING HUMAN INSECURITY AND THE PROSPECTS FOR
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION, GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND, THE SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2 (2005);
For a detailed account of electoral violence in Haiti, See Rapport d’enquete sur le
deroulement des elections, Institut Mobile d’Education De´mocratique IMED (2009).
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challenge the seizures. Only a single specialized land court exists
in the country, in the volatile Artibonite region, and two out of the
three judge positions on that court remained empty for much of
the last decade.  The weakness of the land registry system—only
an estimated five percent of land is officially registered—has ena-
bled numerous overlapping land claims.72  Violence between rival
groups has at times erupted over land grabs by well-connected
elites—often seized with the permission of their patrons in
exchange for political service.73  Local rivalries over land, jobs and
business interests have sometimes been coopted by larger political
forces and erupted into political violence.74 The judicial system has
largely been unable to resolve these disputes, allowing powerful
political patrons to allocate and transfer control over land and
other economic assets at will.
Perhaps even more importantly, the weakness of the local
judiciary has allowed influence over elections.  Influence over the
appointment of local prosecutors and judges enables local politi-
cians to influence the resolution of electoral disputes and organize
violent intimidation with little consequence to the perpetrators.75
The ability to influence electoral outcomes in turn has enabled
local politicians to appoint local officials, thereby entrenching con-
trol at the local level and making them indispensable to national
politics.  This system of local control has affected national-level
electoral results as national level politicians have relied on local
clients to mobilize their communities during elections.
Given the judiciary’s importance to maintaining authority at
the national and local levels, political forces have constrained the
space available for reforms to the structure, organization and
legal framework governing the justice sector. Once in power, no
political leader has allowed the judiciary to develop in ways that
72. KEITH CRANE ET AL., BUILDING A MORE RESILIENT HAITIAN STATE 47-48 (RAND
2010).
73. For a recent example, see Victor Jean Junior, Un Conflit Terrien Divise
Ganthier, LE NOUVELLISTE (June 21, 2010), available at http://lenouvelliste.com/
article4.php?newsid=80655.
74. One of the most notorious instances of such violence occurred in St. Marc in
2004 when a contest over control of the lucrative port in St Marc between rival local
groups – one aligned with the ruling Aristide government and the other aligned with
its opponents – escalated to armed opposition and violent response by the police and
other pro-government forces that led to the deaths of at least 27 people, many of them
unarmed civilians. The “La Scierie massacre” was one of the major factors that
contributed to the end of Aristide’s second term. See Anne Fuller, A Propos du
Massacre de la Scierie, LE NOUVELLISTE, Apr. 9, 2005.
75. For a detailed account of electoral violence at the local level, See Rapport
d’enquete sur le deroulement des elections, supra note 71.
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might constrain the power of the executive to consolidate its con-
trol over the resources of the state or to limit opposition.  Instead
of putting in place legal constraints that might protect them when
they are out of power, the members of each ruling party have
tended toward consolidating control in order to keep their allies in
power, sometimes hanging on through the use of violence or elec-
toral fraud rather than risk losing their control of the state.  In the
absence of the necessary political space, efforts to promote judicial
independence and legal reforms have stalled, leaving programs
aimed at strengthening judicial performance through training or
administrative changes mired in organizational dysfunction.
Where reforms have advanced, as in the adoption of the three
laws favoring judicial independence in 2007, they have reflected a
prevailing political opening.  The three laws were adopted partly
because of donor support that went far beyond technical assis-
tance in providing financial support to advocacy groups and facili-
tating compromise among legislators.76  The laws were also
adopted in a period of relative stability and political inclusion,
when President Rene Preval, following a period of violence and
political tension, appeared to be seeking a “departure from the
inherent winner-takes-all dialectics in Haitian politics” by engag-
ing with elements of the political opposition.77  After becoming
mired in a political struggle that led to the fall of his government
and nearing the next round of elections, Preval ultimately balked
on the implementation of the three laws, which were never imple-
mented during this term. His successor, President Michel
Martelly, campaigned for improvements in the rule of law, and
promised specifically to implement the three laws and establish
the High Judicial Council in the first days of his administration.
Yet he, too, encountered familiar problems as a deadlock between
the executive and the opposition-dominated legislature stalled the
formation of the government and fueled political tension.78 When
the High Judicial Council was finally established over a year into
76. NCSC, Haiti Judicial Strengthening and Stabilization Initiatives: Final
Report X, (2008) available at https://www.conferences.state.gov/RM/programevalua
tion2011/Related%20Documents/Capacity%20Building%20Workshops/Measuring
%20Stability_How%20Do%20You%20Know%20You%20Are%20Making%20Progress_
Haiti%20Stabilization%20Initiatives%20Case%20Study.pdf_.
77. JOEL KELLENBERG & ANDREW DUNCAN, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS,
HAITI’S CAUTIOUS IMPROVEMENT, BUT ARISTIDE QUESTION REMAINS UNANSWERED
(2007), available at http://www.coha.org/haiti%E2%80%99s-cautious-improvement-
but-the-aristide-question-remains-unanswered/.
78. ROBERT MAGUIRE, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, PEACE BRIEF 131
(2012), available at http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB-131.pdf.
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Martelly’s term, it quickly became mired in a baldly political con-
troversy over its nominations to the Permanent Electoral Coun-
cil.79  Although the High Judicial Council was eventually
established, it began on a weak political footing and with limited
capacity to fulfill its functions.
Influence on judicial outcomes and structure at the local and
national levels has thus facilitated patterns of local and national
level politics.  The weakness of the judiciary—which remains
under executive control and prone to manipulation—has enabled
politicians to concentrate power at the local and national level.
Given this set of priorities, the weak and politicized justice system
has served little purpose for most Haitians in need of resolving
disputes or crimes. They tend to encounter the system only when
they run afoul of some powerful interest that seeks to use the judi-
ciary in its favor.  Meanwhile, reforms that would alter the struc-
ture, independence or legal framework and shift this balance have
consistently stalled.
IV. THE LIMITATIONS OF FOREIGN AID TO THE HAITIAN
JUSTICE SYSTEM
Within this context, the aid provided by external donors has
had limited impact on the evolution of the justice sector. The jus-
tice system was the target of over $75 million of foreign aid pro-
grams between 1993 and 2010, provided mostly by the United
States, Canada, France, and the European Union, along with
additional resources provided by the UN Development Program
and UN Peacekeeping missions.80 As described above, these
donors have invested in a wide range of programs and projects
aimed at addressing legal and organizational deficits through
training, technical assistance, and equipment for judges and pros-
ecutors.  Their programs have pursued a variety of approaches,
from increasing knowledge and skills through training, to setting
up case registration and tracking systems, to refurbishing court-
79. The High Judicial Council is constitutionally mandated to select three
members of the Permanent Judicial Council. See Haiti-Justice: New Step in the Crisis
CSPJ/CEP, HAITI LIBRE (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-6854-
haiti-justice-new-step-in-the-crisis-cspj-cep.html.
80. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/T-NSIAD-00-257, FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE LACK OF HAITIAN COMMITMENT LIMITED SUCCESS OF U.S. AID TO JUSTICE
SYSTEM 1 (2000). This amount does not include additional funds devoted to the police,
including over $100 million between 1993 and 2000, and additional funds since then.
See Fortin and Pierre on police. See Isabelle Fortin & Yves-Francois, Haiti et la
Re´forme de la Police Nationale, THE NORTH-SOUTH INSTITUTE 13 (2008).
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houses, prosecutors’ offices and ministry buildings. In many cases,
these various approaches have been pursued simultaneously. For
instance, a 2004 report commissioned by USAID included twenty-
three sets of recommendations, ranging from the overhaul of legis-
lation and procedures as well as the establishment of new admin-
istrative procedures, to the reform of legal, judicial education,
training, and expansions of legal aid services.81  Yet few of these
efforts have translated into sustained changes.
Critics have sought to explain the failure of so many years
and millions of dollars of assistance by pointing to insufficient
coordination among donors and inappropriate interventions. Sev-
eral accounts have emphasized insufficient coordination among
multiple donors with different approaches to judicial reform.82
Lack of agreement about basic principles and structures has led to
conflicting recommendations that differ according to a donor’s
legal tradition, and which sow confusion rather than facilitate
reform.  The lack of coordination has also led to imbalances among
various parts of the justice system, including much higher levels
of resources devoted to the police than to the judiciary or prison
system. Assistance has been fragmented and intermittent, often
stopping and starting in response to political changes.  Each time
a program has ended or priorities have changed, fragile invest-
ments have largely collapsed and disappeared, forcing the next
round of aid implementers to begin the same projects anew.  For
example, the Ecole de la Magistrature, which was established in
1994 with Canadian, French and U.S. funding and credited with
training a “new breed” of judges and prosecutors, shut down for
over six years in the midst of legal uncertainty and political tur-
moil.83  Efforts to re-start the program in 2010 were forced to
reconstruct the building and recreate the curricula.84
Another line of critique has focused on the inappropriateness
of donor reform strategies to the local context, in proposing models
81. See generally National Center for State Courts, supra note 31, at 10-12.
82. See Susan Beidas et al., Justice and Security Reform After Intervention: Haiti
in CHARLES CALL, CONSTRUCTING JUSTICE AND SECURITY AFTER WAR 69, 92 (U.S. Inst.
of Peace Press 2007).
83. Id.
84. In 2010, the French government and UNDP sponsored a 10-month training of
20 Haitian magistrates in France’s national judicial training school (Ecole Nationale
de la Magistrature) in Bordeaux, France. Upon their return, the school provided some
additional training. Nouveaux Magistrats Viennent Renforcer le Systeme Judiciaire
Haitien, PNUD (May 28, 2012), http://www.undp.org/content/haiti/fr/home/press
center/articles/2012/05/28/vingt-nouveaux-magistrats-viennent-renforcer-le-syst-me-
judiciaire-ha-tien/.
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based on their own countries rather than Haitian realities.85  A
USAID evaluation report, for example, faulted one of its programs
for failing to conduct an appropriate “needs analysis” and institut-
ing generic case management processes rather than building on
existing ones.86 Donors have also been faulted for “overly optimis-
tic presumptions” regarding the impact of external resources
along with “little consideration of absorptive capacity or measure
of the true interest in change.”87  As a result, much of the aid
money has not been spent, while proposed procedures, techniques
and skills have not been adopted.
Underlying all of these critiques has been a fundamental mis-
calibration of aid programs to the local reality, and particularly
the political context. On the one hand, donors have recognized the
role of political pressures in blocking their attempts to put in place
new laws, procedures and structures.  In 2000, a report by the
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that “the Haitian
government’s lack of a clear commitment to addressing the major
problems of its police and judicial institutions has been the key
factor affecting the success of the U.S. assistance provided to these
institutions.”88  The Canadian government similarly justified its
decision after 2000 to “terminate most of its support to public
institutions, especially in the area of security and justice” as a
result of “the Haitian government’s lack of political will to reform
the public sector as a whole and improve all forms of govern-
ance.”89  Although donors have occasionally shifted their
approaches or delayed programs in response to political changes,
their responses have rarely demonstrated an understanding of the
political dynamics that have shaped these obstacles.  They have
tended to pursue the same types of programs focused on address-
ing the same legal and organizational deficits without addressing
the underlying political issues. Donors’ assessment of “political
will” has tended to focus on the perceived commitment of individ-
ual decision-makers to a particular reform despite frequent
changes among high-level officials.  They have devoted much less
85. RICHARD HUNTINGTON ET AL., UNITED NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
(UNDP) OUTCOME EVALUATION: RULE OF LAW, JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, at 2, 18
(Aug. 29, 2003).
86. NCSC (2006), supra note 7, at 37.
87. HUNTINGTON ET AL., supra note 85, at 20.
88. JESS T. FORD, LACK OF HAITIAN COMMITMENT LIMITED SUCCESS OF U.S. AID TO
JUSTICE SYSTEM, 5, 8 (Sept. 19, 2000).
89. CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, CORPORATE EVALUATION OF
THE CANADIAN COOPERATION PROGRAM IN HAITI (1994-2002): SUMMARY REPORT 9 (May
2003).
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attention to the conditions that make certain institutions possible
and the actions needed to make reforms sustainable.
In some cases, donors have contributed to the conditions that
undermine the impact of their efforts.  In a context in which the
drive to centralize authority has undermined incentives for build-
ing an independent or credible judiciary, donor aid has also been
highly concentrated, focused primarily on the executive branch.
As one observer noted, aid to the justice system has been “depen-
dent on the goodwill of the minister of justice,” of which there have
been seventeen between 1994 and 2011.90  Although donors have
occasionally provided training or financial assistance to other
actors, including the bar association, non-governmental organiza-
tions, and even the judiciary, political support has been tempo-
rary, short-term and insufficient for fledgling groups to become
organizationally or financially sustainable.91  Meanwhile, deci-
sions on whether or how to engage have largely ignored the per-
spectives of those within and outside the judicial system who were
trying to promote reforms, leaving the pace of reforms in the
hands of the members of the executive who are least likely to have
political reasons to support them.
Donor funding to the justice sector has also tended to concen-
trate resources in urban centers, and primarily in Port-au-Prince.
As described above,  the roots and manifestations of concentrated
authority, as well as the incentives to manipulate the judiciary,
are most clearly evident at the local level. Among the numerous
reports produced by donors on Haitian law, procedure, and insti-
tutional structure, however, few have attempted to analyze local
dynamics of justice either in urban or in rural areas of the coun-
try.  Amidst the focus on legal and institutional deficits, analysis
of the nature of public demands for justice and dispute resolution,
the sources of grievance and dispute, and the performance of
other, non-judicial systems of dispute resolution has been
neglected.  A few surveys have pointed to sharp differences
between rural and urban areas in the type of disputes and griev-
ances that are relevant to citizens, as well as the ways in which
90. Tremblay, supra note 71.
91. Efforts to support civil society in support of justice reform include a USAID
program implemented by IFES in 2000-2003, and a UNDP program called the Forum
Citoyen supported by UNDP from 2004 to 20007 for $1.3 million. According to an
evaluation of the latter program, it resulted in limited impact on policy due to
confrontational relationship. ALEXANDRE RICHELIEU, UNDP, EVALUATION DU
PARTENARIAT PNUD-FORUM CITOYEN POUR LAW REFORM DE LAS JUSTICE EN HAITI:
RAPPORT DE MISSION (July 2008).
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disputes are handled. While urban residents are concerned about
crime and physical security, residents of rural areas—where sixty
percent of the population resides—tend to report concerns and dis-
putes around natural resources, including land and water.92  In
both settings, courts tend to pay an extremely limited role in
resolving disputes.93  The role of courts and law enforcement offi-
cials is more commonly perceived to focus on reinforcing exploita-
tive patterns of authority rather than enabling fair or credible
resolution of disputes.  Nonetheless, most donor programs focused
on “access to justice” have mostly been limited to providing legal
aid for criminal defense with little attention to civil disputes,
assistance for victims, or other forms of dispute resolution.94
Donors have exhibited little understanding of how support for jus-
tice sector or local government actors might affect local patterns of
authority and their implications for equitable resolution of dis-
putes.  At best, aid to the justice system has been mostly irrele-
vant for most Haitians, and at worst it may have reinforced
exploitative patterns of authority.
V. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A NEW ROLE FOR INTERNATIONAL
SUPPORT TO THE HAITIAN JUSTICE SECTOR
The evolution of the justice system in Haiti remains complex
and uncertain, driven by numerous factors that lie beyond the
control of any one actor, especially development agencies and
donors from outside the country. Considerable uncertainty
remains regarding how judiciaries evolve across countries, and
when they are likely to move toward increased credibility, inde-
92. Haugue et al. found that perceptions of insecurity were much higher in urban
than rural areas, with conflicts in rural areas resulting primarily from land disputes
and election, and conflicts in urban areas more focused on politically motivated
violence. A survey conducted by the World Bank found that while 58% of residents of
Port-au-Prince feel unsafe “often or most of the time,” in rural and other urban areas
only 15% of residents feel unsafe. WORLD BANK COUNTRY SOCIAL ASSESSMENT: SOCIAL
RESILIENCE AND STATE FRAGILITY IN HAITI, 32 (Apr. 27, 2006), available at http://site
resources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEV/Resources/3177394-1168615404141/
SocialResilienceandStateFragilityinHaiti-ACountrySocialAnalysis.pdf.
93. In a survey conducted in St. Marc, Gonaives and La Chapelle, Hauge et al.
found that people rarely turned to state institutions to resolve disputes; but when
they did, they preferred the police over the courts due to its efficiency, regardless of
the type of dispute. Wenche Hauge et al., Conflict Prevention in a DDR Context in
Haiti, 2008 INT’L PEACE RESEARCH INST. OSLO (PRIO); see also The WORLD BANK
COUNTRY SOCIAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 92 at 8, 63.
94. A couple of recent examples are programs funded by Canada and USAID,
which assisted people in securing civil status documentation after the earthquake,
but these have been limited in scope and duration.
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pendence and effectiveness.  Nonetheless, the structure and per-
formance of justice systems clearly reflect political and social
conditions particular to each country.  The evolution of the Hai-
tian justice system, the challenges it faces in addressing citizen
needs, and the failure of most reform efforts, cannot be understood
without an examination of the social and political conditions in
which it has developed.  In this article, I highlight one set of fac-
tors that has affected the Haitian justice system over the last two
decades.  The legacy of a repressive and predatory state, combined
with a persistent tendency by political and economic elites to con-
centrate political authority, exclude opposition and organized
interest groups, and rely on informal networks to maintain power
have limited the space for an independent or credible judiciary to
emerge.  Instead, decision-makers at all levels have blocked or
delayed efforts to strengthen the judiciary or constrain executive
power in order to maintain existing patterns of political control.
In these conditions, donor-funded projects have produced new
laws, procedures, practices and skills, but few of these have been
implemented or sustained.
Although these challenges appear daunting to the prospect of
more credible justice institutions that could respond to the needs
of Haitian citizens, they do not necessarily close off the possibility
for more effective or sustainable approaches.  The conditions laid
out above are far from monolithic, and examples exist in which
reforms have advanced and more effective institutions have
emerged.  Investigating such examples of “positive deviance” can
provide the basis for more sustainable approaches to fostering
credible justice institutions in Haiti.95 For example, examining the
conditions that allowed the passage of the judicial independence
laws in 2007 and the establishment of the High Judicial Council
in 2012 can provide clues to the political shifts—such as incen-
tives to reach out to opposition or respond to certain constituen-
cies—that might favor reform.  The efforts of donors to go beyond
technical assistance in mobilizing broader support for the passage
of the laws may also generate valuable lessons.  Similarly, exam-
ining the conditions surrounding the Les Cayes trial, such as the
95. Looking for examples of “positive deviance” is a major component of the
“problem-driven iterative adaptation” approach proposed by Andrews et al., infra,
which also includes gathering evidence to facilitate learning, and engaging a broad
set of agents and stakeholders. See Matthew Andrews et al., Escaping Capability
Traps Through Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation, 8, 13–14 (United Nations
University World Institute for Development Economics and Research, Working Paper
No. 2012-/64, 2012).
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involvement of independent Haitian institutions and the scrutiny
of external actors, might elucidate other factors that have enabled
fair and credible judicial decisions in the Haitian context.  Such an
approach requires looking beyond the specific laws and institu-
tions that affect judicial performance to the conditions that shape
them, and to remain open to alternative forms of institutions and
approaches to supporting change that go beyond the usual legal or
institutional fixes.  It may also require engaging on a sustained
and lasting basis with groups—both within and outside the
state—that can mobilize support and make change possible, even
if the eventual institutional or legal outcome may not have been
expected.
Supporting more credible and responsive justice in the Hai-
tian context may also require more engagement at the local level,
where the core of judicial politics plays out. In Haiti, as elsewhere,
local politics are central to national politics and vice versa, partic-
ularly as they relate to the role of the judiciary.  Local politics may
also be more tractable, and allow greater space for groups outside
entrenched power structures to influence outcomes.  Looking
closely at justice issues in rural or marginalized urban areas may
also reveal alternative modes of dispute resolution that are more
conducive to fair and credible dispute resolution.  Haiti is actually
quite peaceful by regional standards, with extremely low levels of
crime despite widespread poverty and scarcity.96  This suggests
the presence of effective and credible mechanisms to resolve at
least certain types of disputes.  Engaging at this level therefore
requires deeper knowledge of local grievances, capacities and rela-
tionships and how they interact.  Donors can begin by investing in
research that elucidates the types of conflicts and grievances that
fuel demand for justice in different areas of Haiti, the varieties of
existing dispute resolution mechanisms, their interface with state
judicial and law enforcement institutions, and their relationship
to local and national structures of power and influence. Such
research can be conducted by local organizations that are embed-
ded in communities and familiar with the context. It can help
point toward issues like land, housing and water that have been
largely neglected by external donors yet may be crucial to exper-
96. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Haiti’s homicide
rate in 2010 was 6.9 per 100,000 inhabitants, compared to 52 in Jamaica, 35 in
Trinidad, 28 in the Bahamas, 66 in El Salvador, and 24 in the neighboring Dominican
Republic. The homicide rate for the U.S. was 5 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2010, only
marginally lower than Haiti’s. See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 2011 GLOBAL
STUDY ON HOMICIDE 93 (2011).
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iences of justice.  Deeper knowledge of local context can also point
to spaces in which more credible and fair justice is possible, and to
the types of engagements with actors within and outside the state
that might help strengthen capabilities for fair and credible
justice.
Engaging in a way that is more sensitive to national and local
political conditions is neither simpler nor politically neutral. It
raises new questions and dilemmas about the appropriate role for
external assistance.  Donors must be prepared to invest in deeper
local knowledge, in moving beyond the volatility of short-term
approaches and invest in longer-term engagements with broader
sets of actors.  Although perhaps far afield from the technical pro-
grams that have dominated assistance so far, such approaches
may be the crucial building blocks for a more sustainable
approach.
